Admiralty Practicum
Volume 1991
Issue 2 Winter 1991

Article 7

Afram Lines Intern., Inc. v. M/V Capetan Yiannis United States
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 19 June 1990 905 F.2d 347
John Froitzheim '92

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

dard provision in a charter party. Spence v. Mariehamns RIS, 766 F.2d

right to make suggestions, and to the ten pages of instructions on

1504 (11th Circ. 1985). But, the court stated, the amended part of
clause 8 included in the charter party between BSC and Roscoe

proper handling of BSC cargo given to Ceres. The court concluded
that Folan merely regulated the proper handling of BSC cargo so as to

Shipping did not place the responsibility of proper discharge of cargo

avoid any damage to it, and that the ten pages of instructions were

BSC. lrby v. Tokai Lines, 1990 WL 18880, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis

simply a "laundry list" of suggestions on how to handle the various

2116 (E.D.PA. Feb 23, 1990).
The court concluded that the plain language of clause 8 contained
no suggestion that BSC had a duty to supervise, and that the appeiJant

products BSC ships. BSC in fact retained no actual control over the
stevedoring operations. Therefore, no duty could be imposed on BSC
to ensure the safety of the longshoremen.

on

failed to present any extrinsic proof that BSC and Roscoe Shipping

As the depositions of Sorenson and Folan support the finding that

meant to impose such a duty. Therefore, the court rejected Mrs.

BSC was not in any way involved in the operative control of the

Hines' contention that clause 8 was an agreement between the parties

stevedoring operations, and as Sorenson testified that the responsibili

placing the responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen during

ty to ensure the safety of his workers was his own, the Court of
Appeals found no general duty, under Scindia, for BSC to supervise

cargo operations on BSC.
AppelJant's fmal argument was that BSC had such control over the
stevedoring operations as to raise a duty on BSC's behalf to ensure the
safety of Ceres employees. She calJed attention to the right of BSC's
cargo representative to be present during the discharging of cargo, his

stevedoring operations, and no contractual agreements imposing such
a duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of BSC.
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, plaintiff need not post countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original claim when
the plaintiff does not seek to release its property from the counterplaintitT's custody and when the counterplaintitT cannot proceed in rem
or quasi in rem.
FACTS: In December, 1987 Brotherhood Shipping Company, Ltd.

its discretion in requiring Afram to post the sum.

(Brotherhood), owner of the M/V Capetan Yiannis (the vessel)
entered an agreement with a nonparty, Grant Shipping Company, and
Afram Lines International, Inc. (Afram), a Florida corporation. Under
the agreements the vessel was to be subchartered to Afram and was to
carry cargo for Afram from Milwaukee, Wis., to West Africa. The
vessel would be commanded by a Brotherhood employee.

In its decision the court looked first at Rule E(7). The court found
that the rule stands for the proposition that in the event of a counter
claim, where the defendant had given security to respond in damages,
the plaintiff shall give security in the usual amount and form to
respond in damages to the claims found in the counterclaim, unless
the court, for cause shown, otherwise directs. The purpose of the rule,
the court noted, is to "place the parties on an equality as regards to
security."
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1924). The court further found
that to effectuate Rule E(7) the district court has broad discretion to
determine whether, and to what amounts, countersecurity shall be
posted.
Despite this broad discretion, the court stated that the district court
should consider several factors. For example, it should be reluctant to
order countersecurity if the plaintiff does not, by the posting of coun
tersecurity, seek to release its property from the counterplaintiff's cus
tody. Expert Diesel, Inc. v. The Yacht "Fishin' Fool", 627 F. Supp.
432 (S.D.Fla.l986). The court also held that it should be determined
whether the counterplaintiff could have brought an action in rem or
quasi in rem for in the event that the counterplaintiff could not have
proceeded in this manner, there would be little reason to require a
larger bond on the counterclaim than on the original claim. In addi
tion, the court held that the district court should look at the plaintiff's
financial ability to post the countersecurity. Finally, the court held, it
should be considered to what extent the counterclaim may be
frivolous.
Applying the facts, the court of appeals concluded that Afram did
not seek to release any of its property form Brotherhood's custody by
posting countersecurity. It also found that Brotherhood could not pro
ceed in rem or quasi in rem and that Brotherhood sought its recovery
from Afram in personam. With these two factors present, the court
ruled that district courts should not, absent extraordinary circum
stances, require claimants, like Afram, to post countersecurity in an
amount which exceeds the security posted on the original claim. Thus
the court held that the district court had abused its discretion when it
ordered Afram to post full countersecurity.

On December 12, 1987 the parties took the vessel to the port of
Milwaukee and began to load cargo. On December 14, the harbormas
ter issued a notice to alJ affected vessels of an impending storm. After
allegedly receiving ambiguous advice from Afram's Milwaukee rep
resentative, the vessel master decided to keep the vessel tied to the
dock. During the storm the vessel's mooring lines split and the vessel
was pushed repeatedly against the dock causing both vessel and dock
substantial structural damage.
Afram promptly filed an action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
seeking recovery in rem against the vessel and in personam from
Brotherhood for S1.7 million in damages for Brotherhood's alleged
negligence, conversion, and breach of the subcharter agreement. In
response to Afram's demand of security Brotherhood agreed with
Afram to post a $440,000.00 bank guarantee, thereby avoiding arrest
of the vessel.
Afram then instituted an action in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida. Brotherhood filed an answer and a
counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that Brotherhood had sus
tained damages in the amount of $4,724, 4 7 5 . 7 4 which was
attributable to Afram's own conduct. After filing the answer and
counterclaim Brotherhood filed a motion pursuant to Rule E(7) of the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
(Rule E(7)), to compel Afram to post countersecurity. The district
court granted the motion and ordered Afram to post security to the
full stated amount of Brotherhood's claim. Afram filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Afram appealed the decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

ISSUE: Did the district court err in ordering the plaintiff to post
countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original
claim when the plaintiff did not, by posting countersecurity, seek to
release its property from the counterplaintiff's custody and when the
counterplaintiff could not bring an action in rem or quasi in rem?
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ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated
the order of the district court, fmding that the district court had abused
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